LaFayette
1921 - 1924

The man behind the LaFayette was Charles Nash, and financing was provided by Nash’s long-time banker, James Storrow. Nash was the former president of General Motors. When he established his eponymous company in Kenosha, Wisconsin, in 1917 his goal was to build a better Buick. He retained many Buick features in his new Nash, including the use of overhead valve engines. His goal with the LaFayette was similar, namely to build a better Cadillac. Thus, the LaFayette used a V-8.

Nash himself was not an officer in the LaFayette Motors Company, and LaFayette had no formal connection to the Nash Motors Company. It was entirely separate. Not surprisingly, many of the leading engineers and managers in the LaFayette project came directly from Cadillac. Most important was D. McCall White, the chief engineer, who had designed the original Cadillac V-8 of 1915. Others from Cadillac included assistant chief engineer J.W. Applin, sales manager Earl C. Howard, and advertising manager Leo Burnett.

The LaFayette was in many respects more similar to the new Lincoln Model L, produced by the Lincoln Motor Company, than to the contemporary Cadillac it was built to compete with. In particular, it had a 132” wheelbase (similar to Lincoln’s 130” wheelbase), torque tube drive, and an engine with fork-and-blade connecting rods and five main bearings. However, unlike the Lincoln, the LaFayette had a 90 degree rather than a 60 degree V between the engine blocks. The LaFayette represented an approach to automobile production that emphasized high engineering standards, precision manufacturing, and use of only the finest materials. This went beyond the principle of interchangeability of parts that had won Cadillac the Dewar Trophy in 1912. A booklet entitled “LaFayette Manufacturing Precision,” published by the Indianapolis-based Hollenbeck Press in 1920 or 1921, set out the principles behind the LaFayette:

“For many years, the fine cars of Europe have received tribute richly deserved. In engineering principle they do not differ materially from the cars produced in this country. But the method of their manufacture, the precision of the hand-workmanship lavished upon them, has given them a distinct superiority that the best machine-made cars have hitherto only partly achieved.

America’s engineers who have studied abroad have discarded many European manufacturing methods as being impracticable in the United States. But this is no reason why the best American cars should have a different standard of quality. It is quite possible, if enough operations are employed and the standard of workmanship is high enough, to duplicate the most accurate hand work by machinery…”

The booklet then describes many of the special machines and processes used to obtain a “favored tolerance” of less than one-thousandth of an inch in the manufacture of the LaFayette. In fact, the LaFayette engineering staff invented many of the machine tools designed to ensure such a fine tolerance. For example, the LaFayette cylinders were not made of cylinder iron, but of an “alloy metal of unusual hardness and close grain,” and pistons were perfected through 26 different operations performed on a variety of proprietary machines. Parallelism of the crank pin and wrist pin holes was checked on a machine especially designed for that operation. Another machine was designed to ensure perfect parallelism of the piston and cylinder wall. A whole department existed for the production of connecting rods; straight rods received 42 individual operations, while forked rods received 57. Essentially, the techniques and machines used in the manufacture of the LaFayette extended to a new level the drive towards manufacturing precision that Henry M. Leland launched with his adoption of Johannson gauges at Cadillac in 1908.

At this period of development in the American automobile it was possible for a high-grade car such as the LaFayette to justify its price on the basis that it was far superior to lesser cars in materials, manufacture, and ultimately in performance. This difference disappeared in the 1930s, by the end of which the luxury car became essentially a slightly more expensive medium-priced production car with a longer wheelbase, larger engine, and fancier trim.

Another booklet, entitled “The LaFayette as a Machine,” published in 1922, describes many of the LaFayette’s special engineering features. It states that the LaFayette engine, of 348 cu. in., produced 100bhp (compared to the Lincoln’s 357 cu. in. and 90bhp). It states proudly that “[t]he backbone of the LaFayette engine, the crankshaft, is a chrome nickel steel forging, which for its strength, lightness, rigidity, accuracy of workmanship and sheer mechanical beauty is symbolic of LaFayette manufacturing quality.” The crankshaft was, in fact, a hollow forging and had a total machined weight of only 30 ½ pounds. The booklet goes on to say that “the LaFayette crankshaft has five main bearings with a total length of 11 3/8 inches, more than one third the total length of the shaft…” The engine’s advanced cooling system was often noted by the automotive press. The booklet notes that a single water pump driven from the crankshaft supplied water for both blocks and was of the centrifugal type. An article appearing in Motor Age indicated that “no gearing or bearings are needed for this type of water pump construction, thereby eliminating the necessity of lubrication.” The booklet notes several advantages of torque tube drive. First, it notes that “the combination of straight line power and torque tube drive produces a marked tendency for the rear wheels to stay on the ground under all driving conditions. There is very little loss of power due to the rear wheels spinning on choppy roads.” The booklet also notes that “[t]he torque tube design entirely relieves the springs of every duty except that for which they are primarily intended; namely, that of springing the car…” The booklet is 43 pages long and details many other significant engineering features of the LaFayette. It is noteworthy that at a time when many cars were still relatively unreliable, LaFayette chose to advertise the engineering qualities of the car much more prominently than the beauty of the coachwork, which was also of very high quality.

In fact, production bodies were as fine as the chassis and engine. A booklet published by the The LaFayette Motor Sales Co. of Cincinnati states that “panels are made from heavy gauge aluminum and formed to shape by special hammers. In every instance where welded seams are made, they are thoroughly tested under power hammers to ensure a perfect weld.” The roofs of enclosed cars were one-piece aluminum castings. Upholstery cushions and backs were built of “the best curled hair and quilting procurable over a base of Marshall springs…” Leather was from “the oldest and most reliable sources in the tanning industry.” It was hand-buffed and of a long grain type. In an interesting note the booklet mentions that “the grain of the heavy 1 1/2 inch robe rail strap on open bodies runs the same way as the upholstery. This seeming trifle indicates the attention to detail throughout.” Despite the high quality of production bodies, many purchasers chose to have custom bodies built for their cars. There are many extant photographs of LaFayettes with such custom bodies. Several coachbuilding firms particularly associated with LaFayette were Fleetwood, Derham, and Springfield Body Company.

In its short four-year production life, LaFayette produced only 2267 cars. Therefore it must be considered an engineering rather than commercial achievement. There are several reasons for its commercial failure. First, and most importantly, it was introduced just as the country was entering the short but very severe economic downturn of 1920-1921. Many automobile companies of the period failed in consequence of this economic calamity. Many so-called assemblers failed because they purchased large supplies of parts during the post-war inflation. Most of the failures were like LaFayette, new manufacturers of expensive, high-grade automobiles. Not many people today remember such marques as Argonne, Biddle, Meteor, Richelieu, Phianna, Daniels, Leach, Fox, Kenworthy, H.C.S., Owen Magnetic, Templar, Standard, and Deering Magnetic, all of which were recently introduced expensive cars that failed in the early 1920s. Other, more established names in the industry, such as Mercer, Stevens-Duryea, Locomobile, and even Indianapolis’ Stutz, also failed in this period, or would have done so but for fresh infusions of investment capital.

The second reason LaFayette failed was due to miscommunication between Charles Nash and McCall White. Nash wanted to compete with Cadillac but didn’t want to spend a penny more than was necessary to do so. His approach to business was to produce cars that provided high value for the cost of purchase, i.e. build a better Buick that cost a little less than a Buick, then build a better Cadillac that cost a little less than a Cadillac. However, White believed he had a license to design and build the best car possible without regard to cost. Thus, when it came to market the LaFayette was necessarily considerably more expensive than a Cadillac, more expensive even than a Lincoln. This is not what Nash wanted, and when he took over direct control of LaFayette in 1923 his goal was to find some way to reduce costs. But by then it was too late.

Finally, LaFayette failed because Charles Nash was unwilling to continue building it as a loss leader. Cadillac was profitable but could always fall back on General Motors for support if necessary. Similarly, once Ford purchased the Lincoln Motor Company, its vast resources were available to off-set any losses Lincoln accrued. Nash was unwilling to burden his Nash Motors Company with this financial obligation. After losing $2,000,000 on LaFayette, he pulled the plug and never again sought to build a car in the highest price class.

Estimates suggest that perhaps 1% of the LaFayettes built between 1921-1924 still exist. That would amount to about 22 or 23 cars. In 1922 LaFayette was officially sold to Nash, and in 1987 AMC (the successor to Nash and Hudson) was sold to Chrysler. In 1921 Fiat Chrysler Automobiles (FCA) and Peugeot Societe Anonyme (PSA Group) merged to form Stellantis, an international conglomerate that manufactures 14 separate marques worldwide. It is unlikely, to say the least, that Stellantis regards LaFayette as a valuable asset. Like many fine cars built in Indianapolis in the early years of the automobile industry, the LaFayette is little more than a memory now, but nevertheless made an important contribution to the development of the automobile in its own day.